Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A
Reply to Professor Schulhofer
Joseph D. Granof
In a recent article, entitled "Reconsidering Miranda,"1 Professor Stephen Schulhofer attempts to defend Miranda v. Arizona2
against various levels of challenge. Most fundamentally, he attempts to refute the claim that Mirandarepresents an illegitimate
exercise of judicial power. Somewhat less fundamentally, he also
argues that Miranda involved not only a plausible but a correct-indeed a logically necessary--interpretation of the Constitution. Least fundamentally, Professor Schulhofer attempts to rebut
the policy claim that Mirandahas reduced the effectiveness of law
enforcement.
Putting aside the policy question,4 this article maintains that
Professor Schulhofer has yet to answer the most telling constitutional arguments against Miranda. With regard to the legitimacy
issue, Professor Schulhofer fails fully to perceive, and thus does
not address, the basis of the challenge. At the level of interpretational dispute, Professor Schulhofer's arguments, though more
powerful, are incomplete and, to some extent, based upon faulty
premises.
Section I of this article outlines the objection that Miranda, at
least as the Supreme Court now understands it, represents an exercise of judicial authority not conveyed by the Constitution. Section
II argues that the legitimacy objection can be overcome, but only
by a rather implausible interpretation of the word "compelled."
The rock and hard place are apparent: plausibility comes at the
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
1 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 435 (1987).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
' Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 453 (cited in note 1) (claiming that a finding of compulsion in custodial interrogation follows a fortiori from the Court's holding in Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), that compulsion exists when a prosecutor comments on
the accused's failure to testify).
4 I previously have criticized the policy assumptions underlying modern confessions
law. Joseph D. Grano, Police Interrogation and Confessions: A Rebuttal to Misconceived
Objections, Occasional Paper, The Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York
University School of Law (1987).
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cost of legitimacy; legitimacy comes at the cost of plausibility.
I.

THE LEGITIMACY OBJECTION

Professor Schulhofer succeeds in avoiding the force of the legitimacy objection by ignoring both its nature and its primacy. He
begins his article by positing Miranda's three holdings: first, that
informal pressure to speak can constitute "compulsion" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment; second, that informal compulsion
is present in any custodial interrogation of a suspect; and third,
that specified warnings are required to dispel the compelling pressure.5 With regard to the first, Professor Schulhofer immediately
and correctly observes that not even the slightest doubt about legitimacy can arise, for "it is a normal act of interpretation for a
court to consider whether 'compulsion' was intended to cover informal pressures."' Although the Court's authority to interpret the
constitution cannot assure infallibility, "wrong" decisions, we all
7
may agree, may be perfectly legitimate.
Still avoiding the legitimacy issue, Professor Schulhofer next
attempts to defend the view that custodial interrogation is inherently compelling within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Notwithstanding this conclusion, and somewhat inconsistent with it,
Professor Schulhofer then discusses the Court's "conclusive presumption" of compulsion from the mere existence of custodial interrogation.8 Only here does Professor Schulhofer find it necessary
to address legitimacy. Conceding that one can imagine a case in
which a single custodial question would not actually be compelling,
he states:

' Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 436 (cited in note 1). He adds that the requirement of
specified warnings "raises the concerns about judicial legislation that usually preoccupy Miranda'scritics." Id. In what follows, however, Professor Schulhofer recognizes that the more
fundamental legitimacy objection is grounded in Miranda'suse of a conclusive presumption
with regard to compulsion, not in its specification of warnings. Indeed, he devotes only two
pages to a defense of the warnings.
' Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 436 (cited in note 1).
The legitimacy of judicial review depends upon the premise that Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803), was correctly decided. Neither this premise, however, nor the further
premise that the Court's interpretations of the constitution are final, Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958), assures infallibility. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson concurring). The risk of mistake is inherent in the Marbury-Cooperjudicial function; the risk of unwarranted assumption of power is not.
8 If custodial interrogation actually is inherently compelling in all cases, a conclusive
presumption of compulsion should not be necessary. Without arguing in the alternative,
Professor Schulhofer seems to defend both the proposition that custodial interrogation always is compelling and the proposition that a conclusive presumption of compulsion is justified even though actual compulsion sometimes is lacking.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:174

Because such a case is conceivable, and because the Court's
per se rule would find a fifth amendment violation even in
that case, some critics conclude that Miranda's second holding is itself prophylactic, that the Court did not simply interpret the meaning of compulsion but rather replaced the nocompulsion rule with a much broader prohibition.9
Several points warrant emphasis at the outset. First, the Supreme Court, not "some critics," has concluded that the Miranda
requirements are only prophylactic safeguards to assure that compulsion does not occur. 10 Second, Professor Schulhofer in any
event does not really challenge the claim, for he assumes the burden of defending "conclusive presumptions and related forms of
prophylactic rules" as vital "aids to adjudication."1 Third, to the
extent the quotation gives any indication of the basis of the objection to prophylactic rules, it does so only in its rather cryptic last
clause.
Having failed to articulate the basis of the legitimacy objection, Professor Schulhofer defends prophylactic rules simply by
maintaining that irrebuttable presumptions often are more efficacious than rebuttable presumptions:
But in appropriate circumstances, the same logic applies to
both kinds of presumptions. When an assessment is complex
and often beyond the ken of judges ... or when proof of the

circumstances crucial to a fact-bound judgment is largely
within the control of one party,. . a conclusive presumption
may be the best way, over the run of cases, to minimize adjudicatory error."
For Professor Schulhofer, then, the "proper question" is simply
whether a conclusive presumption of compulsion "is an appropriate adjudicatory tool" in the context of custodial interrogation."
Unfortunately, this analysis completely overlooks the "proper
question." A prophylactic rule in the constitutional context is a
Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 448 (cited in note 1) (emphasis in original), citing as
illustrative of the critics Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. 100 (1985). That Professor Schulhofer
concedes the existence of cases without compulsion contradicts his claim that any custodial
interrogation is inherently compelling. See note 8.
10 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974). See also note 15.
11Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 448 (cited in note 1).
12Id. at 450.
13

Id. at 451.
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court-created rule that can be violated without violating the Constitution itself.14 As the Supreme Court has explained with regard
to Miranda, the police may violate Miranda's prophylactic rules
without necessarily violating the fifth amendment. 15 The proper
question, therefore, is whether the Constitution grants the Supreme Court authority to reverse a conviction, particularly a state
conviction,16 when no constitutional violation has occurred.
Consider the issue in the following context. While the prosecution may not use for any purpose the defendant's involuntary or
actually compelled statements,1 7 the Supreme Court has held that
the prosecution may impeach a testifying defendant with a statement taken in violation of Miranda, provided the statement is voluntary.1 8 Imagine, then, a state case in which the state's highest
court has upheld the prosecution's use of a defendant's statement
both in presenting its case-in-chief and in impeaching the defendant's credibility. On review, the Supreme Court concludes that
although the statement was taken in violation of Miranda, it was
not compelled and hence was properly used for impeachment purposes.1" Nevertheless, adhering to current doctrine, the Supreme
14 Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) ("It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic constitutional rules, such as [the rule] established in Miranda . . ., that their retrospective application will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no
constitutional deprivation."). See also Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 105 (cited in note 9).
" Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-307 and n.1, 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. at 654, 655 n.5, 657-58 and n.7. See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459
(1979).
While arguing that Miranda as originally written was not prophylactic, Professor Yale
Kamisar, one of Miranda'smost ardent defenders, conceded in a debate with me that "there
is no shortage of language in recent Supreme Court opinions indicating that the police may
violate Miranda without violating the Constitution." Eighth Sidney W. Hatcher Memorial
Lecture, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, February 12, 1987; Letter from
Yale Kamisar on file with The University of Chicago Law Review. I have argued that Miranda itself contains the seeds of a prophylactic interpretation. Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at
107-09 (cited in note 9).
16 The Supreme Court's imposition of prophylactic rules on the federal courts through
its "supervisory power" also raises difficult questions. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority
of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 1433 (1984).
17 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
's Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975). This holding by itself proves Miranda's
prophylactic status. See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
1" Professor Schulhofer believes that prophylactic rules are particularly appropriate
when "an assessment is complex and often beyond the ken of judges." Schulhofer, 54
U.Chi.L.Rev. at 450 (cited in note 1). Professor Schulhofer also believes that "in any ranking of the issues that properly demand some form of prophylactic rule, the problem of determining compulsion in the context of custodial interrogation wins the prize hands down."
Id. at 453. The impeachment doctrine, which requires courts to determine voluntariness,
refutes the suggestion that voluntariness determinations are "beyond the ken" of judges.
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Court reverses the state conviction because the prosecution used
the same non-compelled statement not just for impeachment purposes but also in proving its case.2 0
The issue raised by the hypothetical is whether the judicial
power conveyed by Article III of the Constitution 21 authorizes the
Supreme Court to reverse a state conviction when the Constitution
has not been violated. The authority to require reversal in the hypothetical goes beyond the Court's long recognized authority to review the judgments of state courts on questions of federal law.22 To
require reversal, the Supreme Court must either have authority to
create a body of federal common law that is binding on the states23
or, despite separate sovereignties, have some kind of supervisory
power over state courts. In a previous article, I developed at
length an argument that Article III does not give the Court such
authority. 25 I maintained that such authority could not be justified
as "constitutional common law,"28 as a matter of implied judicial
authority, or as a kind of federal question jurisprudence. Professor
Schulhofer, however, does not attempt to justify prophylactic rules
under any of these theories, or indeed under any other constitutional theory. Rather, he ignores altogether the question of the
source of the Court's authority to reverse state convictions when
the Constitution has not been violated.
To the extent that Professor Schulhofer seeks to justify such
power at all, he does so by a two step argument. First, he posits
that conclusive presumptions "are a pervasive feature of judicial
decision making. 2

7

Second, conceding that pervasiveness cannot

prove legitimacy, he simply insists "that the Court would face
enormous adjudicatory burdens if resort to conclusive presumptions was never permissible."2 To illustrate these "enormous burdens," he depicts the futility of the judiciary trying to ascertain on
20 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07, 317-18 (reiterating per se rule of exclusion
with regard to the state's case-in-chief when Miranda is violated).
21 See U.S.Const. art. HI, § 2 (defining the scope of the judicial power).
22 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
23 But see Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (mere grant of jurisdiction
does not authorize federal courts to promulgate a general federal common law).
214But see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts have no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of
constitutional dimension.").
25 Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. 100 (cited in note 9).
26 See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1975) (suggesting the legitimacy of a "constitutional common law").
27 Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 448 (cited in note 1).
28 Id. at 450.
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a case-by-case basis whether "a few punches or kicks" would
render a confession involuntary. Thus, he claims the Court eventually recognized "that even the voluntariness test had to include
prophylactic rules: a single blow would render a confession involuntary per se."'29
Besides failing to address the Article III issue, this argument
reflects a basic misunderstanding both of the nature of conclusive
presumptions and of the Court's use of per se rules. Conclusive
presumptions differ in kind, not simply degree, from rebuttable
presumptions. Indeed, conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary
or adjudicatory devices at all, but rather substantive rules of law:
In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be
taken as true, and the adversary is not allowed to dispute this
at all. For example, if it is proven that a child is under seven
years of age, the courts have stated that it is conclusively presumed that he could not have committed a felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven
years old cannot legally be convicted of a felony."0
The conclusive presumption operates, therefore, to make the presumed fact "legally immaterial." 1
Care must be taken not to confuse per se rules as such with
conclusive presumptions. For example, a rule stating that unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violate due process is a
per se rule that is not dependent upon a conclusive presumption. A
rule stating that unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures
violate due process only if they create a substantial risk of mistaken identification, but stating also that such risk of mistake will
be presumed whenever an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is
used, operates as a per se rule only because of its conclusive presumption.32 While the outcome under both rules will be the same,
the latter rule posits one legal test but, in reality, adopts another.
The difference also can be illustrated by considering Professor
Schulhofer's voluntariness example. If the due process voluntariness test embodies the proposition that a statement is involuntary
only if the suspect's will is overborne, the per se rule against even
29

Id. at 450-51.

Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 966 (3d ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 640 n.2 (1954).
2 See Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 114-15 (cited in note 9).

30
31
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slight physical force functions as a conclusive presumption. With
fact X (the use of physical force) established, the state is not permitted to refute fact Y (involuntariness defined as an overborne
will). Under such an analysis, of course, fact Y (the existence of an
overborne will) is not really part of the legal test; that is, the real
legal test is something other than the posited legal test. If, on the
other hand, the due process voluntariness test really embodies a
normative judgment that a statement is involuntary when the police interrogation techniques are unacceptable," then a per se rule
against physical force may simply reflect a legal conclusion about
the meaning of voluntariness. Under such an analysis, a statement
actually is involuntary (defined as obtained by unacceptable
means) when physical force is used. 4
Returning to Miranda, the Constitution itself posits the legal
test: not self-incrimination but only "compelled" self-incrimination
is prohibited. 5 Thus the Supreme Court is not free to create but
only can interpret the governing standard. If the Supreme Court
concluded that custodial interrogation without warnings actually
and always amounts to compulsion, we would have a per se rule,
but one based on an interpretation of the word "compelled" in the
fifth amendment. Under such an interpretation, the police actually
would violate the fifth amendment whenever they engaged in the
proscribed interrogation. What the Court has said in its recent
cases, however, is not that custodial interrogation always equals actual compulsion but rather that compulsion conclusively will be
presumed from custodial interrogation. The effect, of course, is
that the Court has made the constitutional requirement of compulsion "legally immaterial."
Given that the outcome of both approaches is the same, the
temptation is to insist that the legitimacy question cannot turn on
such a "subtle distinction. 3' 7 Under the proffered analysis, if the

" Despite the Court's overborne will rhetoric, this more accurately describes the due
process voluntariness doctrine. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law
of Confessions, 65 Va.L.Rev. 859, 881, 922-3 (1979). See also the text at notes 43-47.
34 Professor Schulhofer's failure to distinguish per se constitutional rules from conclusive presumptions also is evident in his description of what he labels "reverse prophylactic
rules." Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 449 (cited in note 1). But see id. at 449-50 n.33 (implying that a difference exists between per se constitutional rules and conclusive
presumptions).
" U.S.Const. amend. V. See also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
3' See, e.g, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 n.1.
17 See, e.g., Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 449 n.31 (cited in note 1), describing as a
"subtle distinction" my argument that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), granting
indigents a sixth amendment right to appointed counsel in felony trials, employed a per se
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Court states, albeit "incorrectly," that custodial interrogation as
such always equals compulsion, the legitimacy objection is overcome. But if the Court states, as it has, that compulsion must be
conclusively presumed from custodial interrogation, the legitimacy
objection remains viable. Even if subtle, however, the distinction is
vitally important. First, while Congress may not overturn by statute interpretive decisions, it is quite conceivable that it can reject
the use of conclusive presumptions. 8 Second, the significance of
the distinction lies precisely in the fact that the first statement entails the conclusion that the Constitution actually has been violated while the second statement makes the existence of an actual
constitutional violation irrelevant. As illustrated by the impeachment example previously discussed, the second statement permits
the Supreme Court to reverse a state conviction even when it must
concede that actual compulsion, and hence a constitutional violation, does not exist.
Still, it might be suggested that the above analysis reduces the
legitimacy objection to a semantic quibble. After all, with a slight
change in emphasis, the Court always can transform a conclusive
presumption into an actual constitutional interpretation and thus
eliminate the legitimacy obstacle. Though not without force, this
effort to trivialize the issue also should be rejected. In many instances, the Court resorts to a conclusive presumption because a
holding of actual constitutional infirmity would be implausible. In
the Miranda context, for example, the Court can avoid employment of a conclusive presumption only by insisting that compulsion always is present during custodial interrogation. Thus, for example, the Court would have to find actual compulsion even if a
law professor, aware of his or her rights and wanting to tell the
truth, responded to a single custodial question. 9 A holding that
the Court will not inquire into actual compulsion avoids the need
for such strained judgments.
In summary, if the legitimacy objection is valid, Miranda can
be defended only by an interpretation of the word "compelled"
that makes every violation of Miranda an actual violation of the
fifth amendment. Although this seems implausible on its face, Professor Schulhofer also tries to defend this proposition.
constitutional rule rather than a prophylactic rule. See Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 116-19
(cited in note 9).

" See Monaghan, 89 Harv.L.Rev. at 26-30, 36-37 (cited in note 26).
" The example is Professor Schulhofer's. Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 448 (cited in

note 1).
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II. THE INTERPRETATIONAL DIFFICULTY

In a previous essay, I tried to demonstrate both that the fifth
amendment concept of compulsion in the context of police interrogation must be understood as a synonym for coercion and that the
concept of coercion implicates the same normative judgments as
the due process voluntariness test.40 Professor Schulhofer acknowledges that "[i]f a compelled statement means an involuntary one,"
then Miranda's holding that custodial interrogation is inherently
compelling is "fragile indeed.""' Viewing this as the "decisive question," he attempts to demonstrate that such a view of compulsion
"would make nonsense of the privilege against self-incrimination. '"42

Professor Schulhofer's argument is built upon the erroneous
premise that the voluntariness test prohibits only "the use of 'deliberate means to break the suspect's will.' "43 Thus, to prove his
point that the concepts of compulsion and voluntariness are different, he cites several cases finding fifth amendment compulsion in
which it would be implausible even to suggest that the individual's
will had been overborne. 44 To be sure, the black letter of the voluntariness cases almost invariably refers to overborne wills. 45 Never-

theless, as Professor Kamisar illustrated years ago, the overborne
will language always has obscured the Court's real reasons for excluding particular confessions.46 Indeed, if the Court meant the
overborne will language to be taken literally-to be used as a test
to govern analysis rather than as a shorthand statement of a conclusion-few if any of its due process opinions could have found
47
the defendant's confession involuntary.
While recognizing that the compulsion standard might be rec40 Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea To Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator
and Modern Confessions Law, 84 Mich.L.Rev. 662, 683-89 (1986). See also Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 Amer.Crim.L.Rev. 243, 253-67 (1986); Grano, 65 Va.L.Rev. at 926-37 (cited in note

33).

41 Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 442 (cited in note 1)(emphasis in original).

41 Id. For the view that the term "privilege against self-incrimination" is incorrect and
misleading, see Grano, 84 Mich.L.Rev. at 683 (cited in note 40).
41Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 442 (cited in note 1).
44 Id. at 442-44.
45See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (Frankfurter and Stewart); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
46 Yale Kamisar, What Is An "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogationand Confessions, 17 Rutgers L.Rev. 728, 755-59 (1963).
4' Even a person being tortured makes a conscious choice between yielding to the pressure and resisting further. Grano, 65 Va.L.Rev. at 880-86 (cited in note 33).
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onciled with the due process voluntariness standard by rejecting a
literal reading of the overborne will language, Professor Schulhofer
curiously states that "Miranda'scritics cannot take this route...
because mild interrogation pressures could then render a confession 'involuntary.' 48 This claim, of course, is a non-sequitur. Miranda's critics do take this route because the task, whether viewed
in terms of fifth amendment compulsion or due process voluntariness, is "to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous
'49
confessions.
Conceding at one point that "compulsion cannot be satisfied
by any inconvenience resulting from failure to testify," 50 Professor
Schulhofer nevertheless draws from precedent the rather remarkable principle that compulsion exists if governmental officials apply any psychological pressure for the purpose of overcoming the
suspect's unwillingness to talk. 1 This pressure, in his view, is what
makes custodial interrogation inherently compelling. The cases,
however, do not support such a principle.
Placing considerable reliance on the principle that a public
employee may not be threatened with discharge for refusing to testify, Professor Schulhofer states correctly that a statute subjecting
a defendant to only a small fine for not testifying would clearly
violate the fifth amendment.2 The reason, however, is not as Professor Schulhofer suggests that the fifth amendment prohibits even
mild pressures but rather that the fifth amendment precludes the
state from asserting a claim of right to the defendant's testimony. 3
By analogy, although an officer's claim of authority to search automatically renders consent invalid, 54 consent will not be deemed involuntary simply because it is given under circumstances of mild
48 Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 443 (cited in note 1).
49 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966) (Harlan, Stewart, and White dissenting)

(emphasis in original).
50

Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 444 (cited in note 1).

5' Id. at 445-46.
52 Id. at 443.
53 Such a statute

would implicate the fifth amendment "in its most pristine form."
Portash, 440 U.S. at 459. Indeed, as Professor Schulhofer seems to recognize, Miranda had
to justify extending the fifth amendment's reach from its historical concern with legal process and formal sanctions to the somewhat different concern of informal pressure. (This
extension of the fifth amendment itself can be criticized. Grano, 65 Va.L.Rev. at 926-27
(cited in note 33)). Extending the fifth amendment to cover informal pressure, however,
does not necessarily require that pressure analysis now be factored into all of the amendment's historical applications. Rather, Professor Mayers is correct in observing that the fifth
amendment has come to embody several distinct rules, each with a somewhat different line
of development. Lewis Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? 1 (1959).
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968).
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pressure.5 5 The issues of claim of authority and undue pressure absent such a claim are analytically distinct, and for historical reasons they have been treated differently in the fifth amendment
context.
Professor Schulhofer is on firmer ground when he relies on
Griffin v. California,5 6 which prohibited comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. "If a comment on silence generates
impermissible pressure to speak at trial (where the comment adds
only marginally to inferences the jury will draw anyway), can we
say that a police officer's request for information, addressed to an
unwarned suspect in custody, does not create impermissible pressure? ' 57 Of course, Griffin may be viewed as an impermissible penalty rather than a compulsion case, because the defendant did not
yield to the pressure. Professor Schulhofer probably is correct,
however, in viewing such an interpretation of Griffin as lame, for
the issue of what constitutes an impermissible penalty must have
something to do with the issue of what constitutes compulsion.
More plausibly, Griffin may be viewed as a case dealing with a core
fifth amendment concern: the defendant's trial right not to be put
under oath to testify."' Finally, as Professor Schulhofer recognizes,
Griffin, which was decided just one year before Miranda, itself can
be challenged.
As Professor Schulhofer recognizes, "debate about the meaning of compulsion cannot be settled simply by resort to stare decisis. '59 Thus, to the extent that Griffin turns on a conclusion that
even exceedingly mild pressure constitutes compulsion, rather than
on one of the bases suggested above, it requires defense. Observing
accurately that the Court has shown no inclination to reconsider
Griffin, Professor Schulhofer defends Griffin by suggesting that the
Court could overrule its holding only by rejecting both the holdings in the employment discharge cases and the unchallenged understanding that the fifth amendment would not permit the state

55 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
56 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
'7 Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 453 (cited in note 1).
" See note 53. There is no doubt that the Court scrutinizes more strictly claims of
compulsion relating to trial testimony. Compare Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612
(1972) (invalidating statute that required defendant to testify prior to other defense witnesses) with Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 (1970) (upholding a statute requiring the
defendant to provide pretrial discovery to the prosecutor). Griffin also may reflect the concern that a jury may give undue weight to the defendant's failure to testify.
59 Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 442 (cited in note 1).
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to fine a person for refusing to testify. 0 As already indicated, however, the outcomes in these latter areas are not dependent upon a
conclusion that even mild pressure constitutes compulsion." Griffin, in short, cannot be defended by positing a parade of horribles
that might follow its demise.
While the meaning of compulsion in an argument about first
principles ultimately cannot be decided by the weight of precedent, it is worthwhile to observe that the conflict in the cases is
not, as Professor Schulhofer implies, simply between Griffin and
Miranda, on the one hand, and a few post-Miranda cases on the
other. Outside the context of formal sanctions, the Supreme Court
always has treated "compelled" and "involuntary" as virtually synonymous. When, long before Miranda, the Court first suggested
that the fifth amendment applied to police interrogation in federal
proceedings, the Court employed a voluntariness test.62 Likewise,
in federal cases involving the admissibility of a defendant's statements obtained at the preliminary examination-cases indubitably
governed by the fifth amendment-the Court applied the voluntariness standard of the confession cases.6 1 Similarly, the Court applied a voluntariness test in cases presumably subject to the fifth
amendment 4 but not governed by Miranda because of the nonretroactivity of that decision.6 5 The Court also applied the same
voluntariness test to cases of non-custodial interrogation 6 and in
other fifth amendment contexts.6 7
In short, with the exception of Miranda and possibly Griffin,
the Court's fifth amendment cases involving informal pressure al-

60 Id. at 443.
61 See notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
62 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 558, 562 (1897). Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions in federal cases employed the same voluntariness standard. See, e.g., Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924). Even in reviewing state cases, the Court saw no difference between the federal fifth amendment standard and the due process voluntariness standard. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944).
63 Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 162
U.S. 613, 623 (1896). See also Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 938, 941-42 (1987).
6 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (applying the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause to the states). At the least, Malloy applied to those cases in which the state
activity and trial occurred after the date of its decision.
" See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1969).
66 See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). Professor Schulhofer
does not suggest that Miranda applies in the non-custodial context.
6'7 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186-88 (1977) (grand jury). The
Court even has relied on the voluntariness doctrine in employee discharge cases. See, e.g.,
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-500 (1967).
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ways have treated a compelled statement as an involuntary one.
Moreover, no case, including Miranda, ever has suggested that either the pressure of mere questioning or the pressure of custody
without questioning is sufficient by itself to render a statement
compelled or involuntary. Yet Professor Schulhofer insists that
fifth amendment precedent requires that we treat as compelled-now distinguished from involuntary-a statement obtained by directing a single question to a suspect only moments
after he has been taken into custody. No more than language or
logic, the cases cannot support this burden.
If, as Professor Schulhofer claims, compulsion results from
any psychological pressure designed to overcome a suspect's unwillingness to talk, non-custodial interrogation also must be "inherently compelling." 68 By not criticizing Miranda's limitation to
custodial interrogation, Professor Schulhofer implicitly concedes
that the concept of compulsion, like that of voluntariness, must be
concerned with degrees of pressure, with sifting out undue pressure. Nevertheless, he insists that every successful custodial interrogation, without some kind of Miranda protection, yields a "compelled" statement and violates the fifth amendment. Given that
this implausible view, taken seriously, ultimately would require the
abolition of police interrogation, in that Miranda's procedural litany cannot eliminate the mild pressure of which he complains, 9
Professor Schulhofer perhaps should explain what makes such a
view so appealing to him.70
68 As a factual matter, many non-custodial interrogations exceed in pressure many custodial ones. On the aggregate, however, custodial interrogation undoubtedly exerts more
pressure. Some may want to use this conclusion to defend an irrebuttable presumption of
compulsion in the custodial context, but this would bring us back to the legitimacy
objection.
09 Given his view of compulsion, Professor Schulhofer understandably is forced to conclude that Miranda did not go far enough. Schulhofer, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 454, 461 (cited in

note 1).
11 To the extent that the constitutional definition of compulsion requires normative
judgments, it may seem that one's views on this issue are not susceptible to logical debate
but ultimately must depend upon intuitive judgments. See George M. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 Wash.U.L.Q. 275,
330. Unconvinced by such a relativistic perspective, I have attempted in other essays to
elaborate reasons to prefer a definition of compulsion that permits the interrogator to exert
some pressure on the suspect and to employ tactics designed to outwit him. Grano, Occasional Paper (cited in note 4); Grano, 84 Mich.L.Rev. at 676-89 (cited in note 40). In my
view, Professor Schulhofer has not provided policy support for his unconventional proposals
regarding the meaning of compulsion. To the extent that strained interpretations of the
Constitution ever can be justified, they would seem to require the most compelling of policy
arguments.
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CONCLUSION

Under the Court's current view, Miranda imposed on the
states mere prophylactic rules that can be violated without necessarily violating the Constitution. By not explaining the source of
the Court's authority to impose such rules, Professor Schulhofer
leaves the decision subject to a challenge of illegitimacy. Under the
view of Mirandathat Professor Schulhofer would prefer, every Miranda violation would amount to fifth amendment compulsion.
Professor Schulhofer has shown neither that such a view is plausible nor that it is desirable.
Postscript
Defending Professor Schulhofer's thesis, Professor David
Strauss, in The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,7 1 argues, first,

that the assertion that rebuttable and conclusive presumptions differ in kind not degree "rings false" and "proves false,"72 and, second, that prophylactic rules are pervasive in constitutional law.
7
Farettav. California
3 can be used to illustrate the difference
between rebuttable and conclusive presumptions. In Faretta,the
Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment confers both the
right to have the assistance of counsel and the opposite right to
proceed pro se.74 Nevertheless, in effect creating a rebuttable presumption against waiver of counsel, the Court emphasized that demanding waiver criteria must be satisfied before the right of selfrepresentation is triggered.7 5 Had the Faretta Court gone further,

however, and adopted a conclusive presumption that an unrepresented defendant has not made a valid waiver, its presumption
would have been the equivalent of a rule of law that waiver of
counsel, and thus self-representation, is neither protected constitutionally nor permitted. Unlike a rebuttable presumption against
waiver, a conclusive presumption against waiver could not have coexisted with a right of self-representation. Conclusive presumptions are substantive rules of law, not adjudicatory devices. 6
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 190 (1988).
Id. at 192.
7- 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
7'Contra, Joseph D. Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 Minn.L.Rev. 1175, 1179-1208 (1970). Because it interpreted actual sixth amendment
requirements, Farettaraises no legitimacy question.
75 422 U.S. at 835-36.
7'Professor Strauss suggests that my real objection to Miranda either is or ought to be
that the Court did not consider adequately whether a conclusive presumption is required to
minimize the sum of administrative and error costs. Strauss, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 194 (cited
"1

72
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Professor Strauss insists, however, that a court always can
fashion a rebuttable presumption that is virtually impossible to
overcome, and accordingly that "there is no sensible reason to distinguish between such a barely rebuttable presumption and the explicitly conclusive presumption of Miranda."'7 Such an argument
is premised upon judicial bad faith. Moreover, bogus rebuttable
presumptions should be seen for what they really are.7 8
The important issue, as Professor Strauss recognizes, is
whether prophylactic rules that function as conclusive presumptions are illegitimate in constitutional law.7 9 Professor Strauss's defense of prophylactic rules relies primarily on the proposition that
such rules are pervasive.8 0 Professor Stauss's claim may be disputed. To take but one example, Professor Strauss maintains that
Lovell v. Griffin"' promulgated a "judge-made prophylactic rule
8 s2
designed to implement the purposes of the first amendment.
The Court in Lovell invalidated an ordinance that gave a city manager unfettered discretion to grant permission for the distribution
of literature. The Court said this:
We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever
the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such
that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the
press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle
for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against
the power of the licensor ....
[T]he prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. 3

in note 71). As the text reveals, this is not my objection.
7 Id. at 192.
78 Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 147 n.303 (cited in note 9).
7 Professor Strauss ponders my view of conclusive presumptions that work against defendants. Strauss, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 191 n.10 (cited in note 71). In New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460 (1981), for example, the Court held that under the search incident to arrest
rule, the passenger compartment of a car is generally, if not inevitably, within an arrested
occupant's reach. If the Court employed error and administrative costs to determine actual
fourth amendment reasonableness, Belton is legitimate, though perhaps incorrect. See Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19
Amer.Crim.L.Rev. 603, 646-47 (1982) (Belton incorrect). If the Court said, instead, that the
Constitution is violated if the search exceeds actual reach, but that courts must conclusively
presume that the passenger compartment is within a recent occupant's reach, it acted
illegitimately.
80 Strauss, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 190, 195 (cited in note 71).
81 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
82

83

Strauss, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 197 (cited in note 71).
303 U.S. at 451-52.
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Notwithstanding this language indicating that an actual first
amendment violation occurred, Professor Strauss insists that the
"most natural interpretation of the first amendment is that all it
requires is that persons not be prohibited from distributing leaflets
for improper reasons."' With this premise, Strauss argues that
Lovell's requirement of standards to guide discretion functioned
prophylactically by conclusively presuming bad motives. Such rewriting of cases, of course, can make prophylactic rules appear to
be everywhere.
Professor Strauss also overlooks the possibility that the Constitution itself may act instrumentally. That is, the first amendment may prohibit standardless licensing discretion not as an evil
in itself but because of a concern that such discretion too easily
will permit license denials for the "wrong" reasons. Under such a
reading, standardless discretion nevertheless violates not a Court
imposed prophylactic rule but the Constitution itself. 5 If this is
how Lovell read the first amendment-and this reading, unlike
Professor Strauss's, comports with the Court's language-its holding cannot be analogized to what the Court said it did in Miranda.
Although space does not permit refutation of Professor
Strauss's description of other constitutional doctrines as prophylactic, the argument would proceed along the same lines. Nevertheless, Professor Strauss has suggested an appropriate subject of inquiry, for one requisite of a constructive debate is that we know
the scope of the issue.

Strauss, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 196 (cited in note 71).
See Grano, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 118 & n.101 (cited in note 9). See also id. at 155-56
(discussing the first amendment overbreadth doctrine).

